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Abstract
The public provision of long-term care (LTC) can replace family-
provided LTC when adults are not su¢ ciently altruistic towards their
elderly parents. But State intervention can also modify the transmis-
sion of values and reduce the long-run prevalence of family altruism in
the population. That evolutionary e¤ect questions the desirability of the
LTC public provision. To characterize the optimal LTC policy, we develop
a three-period OLG model where the population is divided into altruistic
and non-altruistic agents, and where the transmission of (non) altruism
takes place through a socialization process à la Bisin and Verdier (2001).
The optimal short-run and long-run LTC policies are shown to di¤er, to
an extent varying with the particular socialization mechanism at work.
Keywords: long-term care, altruism, socialization, optimal policy, crowd-
ing out e¤ect.
JEL codes: I12, I18, J14, Z13.
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1 Introduction
The provision of long-term care (LTC) constitutes a major challenge for ad-
vanced economies. As a consequence of the ageing process, an increasingly large
number of persons report having some type of functional limitation (e.g. sensory,
physical or mental limitations), which prevent them from being autonomous. To
give an idea, the European Union (2009) forecasts that the number of elderly
dependents in the EU-27 will grow from about 21 millions of people in 2007 to
more than 44 millions of people in 2060. Such a substantial rise in the number
of elderly dependents will stimulate the aggregate demand for LTC services.
Whatever the demand for LTC services is satised by informal care (pro-
vided by family or friends) or by formal care (either at home or in nursing
homes), helping the dependent elderly is extremely costly.1 This explains why
the funding of LTC services has become a major research area.
A large number of articles have recently focused on what is called the "LTC
insurance puzzle".2 That puzzle can be stated as follows: although the proba-
bilities to become dependent are large, and although LTC is costly, individuals
do not, in general, purchase a private insurance against LTC.3 Various explana-
tions have been provided, such as excessive loading factors (Cutler 1993; Brown
and Finkelstein 2004a), crowding out of private insurance by social insurance
(Sloan and Norton 1997; Norton 2000; Brown and Finkelstein 2004b), and trust
into family altruism (Hoerger et al 1996; Sloan et al 1997).
A related issue concerns the design of the optimal public intervention in the
context of old-age dependency. In a pioneer paper, Jousten et al (2005) studied
the optimal LTC policy in an economy where households are composed of one
dependent parent and one child, under heterogeneity on the degree of altruism
of children towards their parents. They found that, under asymmetric infor-
mation about the altruism of children, the optimal policy consists of providing
low quality of institutional care to the elderly in need, to satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraint. More recently, Pestieau and Sato (2008) examined
the optimal tax policy in an economy where a fraction of the elderly becomes
dependent, and where young adults di¤er in their productivity at work.
Those articles, by paying attention to heterogeneity within families, and to
the di¢ culties raised by informational asymmetries, cast an original light on
the optimal State intervention in the context of LTC provision. However, those
static frameworks cannot account for another key aspect of the problem: the
impact of public intervention on the familys private provision of LTC, through
its inuence on the transmission of family values.
Suppose that we are in the economy studied by Jousten et al (2005), and
that the government commits itself to helping elderly parents in need as a result
1For instance, the average cost of institutional LTC for old persons in France is about
35,000 euros per year (OECD 2006), whereas the yearly price of a nursing home in the U.S.
ranges between 40,000 and 75,000 $ (see Taleyson 2003).
2See Pestieau and Ponthiere (2011) for a survey.
3According to Kemper and Murtaugh (1991), a man of age 65 has a 0.33 probability to
enter a nursing home in the U.S., whereas that probability exceeds 0.50 for women.
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of non-altruistic children. Is it then the case that altruism, as a value, will, in
the long-run, survive in the population? Or will the States intervention crowd
out family altruism, by inuencing the societys transmission of values? What
kind of restrictions does the intergenerational transmission of values impose on
the optimal LTC provision by governments?
Those questions can only be answered in a dynamic framework, where the
composition of the population in terms of altruistic and non-altruistic individu-
als is a variable, which evolves over time as the output of a socialization process.
The goal of the present paper is precisely to examine, within such a framework,
the conditions under which the provision of LTC by the State crowds out the
provision of LTC by families through its e¤ects on the intergenerational trans-
mission of values.
For that purpose, we develop here a three-period overlapping generations
model (OLG) where the adult population is divided into altruistic and non-
altruistic agents, and where the transmission of (non) altruism takes place
through a socialization process à la Bisin and Verdier (2001). In that frame-
work, parents, who are certain to be dependent at the old age, can inuence the
probability that their child will take some trait thanks to socialization e¤orts.
Socialization is costly, but it exhibits also some potential gains at the old age:
the parent of an altruistic child will, once dependent, receive the help of his
child (whatever he was himself altruistic or not). The incentive to socialize the
child depends thus on what the elderly receive when his child is not altruistic.
This is where the States intervention inuences the socialization process, and,
hence, the long-run composition of the population.
Anticipating our results, we rstly study the dynamics of heterogeneity at
the laissez-faire, and identify the determinants of the survival or disappearance
of family altruism, under alternative assumptions regarding the transmission
mechanisms of traits. Then, we introduce lump sum transfers towards the par-
ents of non-altruistic children, and show how this transfer scheme may, under
some conditions, a¤ect the long-run composition of the population. The condi-
tions under which the State crowds out the family provision of LTC are iden-
tied. In a third stage, we characterize the optimal public intervention, both
in the short-run (i.e. for a xed partition of the population into altruistic and
non-altruistic agents), and in the long-run (i.e. for a variable partition). We
show that the existence of intergenerational composition e¤ects through social-
ization tends, under some conditions, to restrict the optimal public provision of
LTC to a (positive) level that is lower than the optimal short-run provision.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
The long-run population dynamics under the laissez-faire is studied in Section
3. Section 4 examines the impact of State-provided LTC on the population dy-
namics. The optimal short-run and long-run public interventions are compared
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The model
2.1 Environment
Let us consider a three-period OLG economy. Each cohort is a continuum of
agents whose length is normalized to unity. First period is childhood, during
which the child does not work, does not consume, and does not take any decision.
Second period is young adulthood, during which agents work, consume, and
make one child. All young adult agents earn an income y > 0 during that
period. Third period is the old age; elderly persons are retired and dependent.4
Thus every young adult has an elderly dependent parent. We assume also, like
Jousten et al (2005), that there is no private saving for dependency.5
All children are assumed to be identical. However, there exist two types of
adult agents: altruistic agents (i.e. type a) care about their parents, whereas
non-altruistic parents (i.e. type n) do not care about their parents. We denote
by qt the fraction of altruistic adults within the young adult cohort at time t.
The di¤erence between agents of types a and n lies in the fact that type-a agents
derive, when being young, some welfare from the resources consumed by their
parents, unlike type-n agents. Following Jousten et al (2005), that di¤erence
can be modelled by assuming that the utility from consumption for a young
adult agent of type i 2 fa; ng takes the form:
u(ci) + iv(di) (1)
where ci denotes the young adults own consumption when being young, di is
the consumption of his parent, while u() and v() are temporal utility functions
for the young adult and the elderly adult. We assume that those functions
satisfy standard properties: u0() > 0, u00() < 0, v0() > 0 and v00() < 0. The
parameter i accounts for the altruism of children towards their elderly parent.
Agents of types a and n di¤er as to the level of i:6
0 = n < a = 1 (2)
2.2 Socialization
The population follows an adaptation and imitation process of the type modelled
by Bisin and Verdier (2001). The transmission of the parameter i reecting
childrens altruism towards their old dependent parents, is modelled as a mech-
anism where socialization inside the family and socialization outside the family
interact. The rst type of socialization is called the vertical transmission (from
parents to children), whereas the second type is called the oblique transmission
(from a "role model" in the society to the child).
4We assume here no risk about the length of life, which is a signicant simplication. See
Ponthiere (2010) on the interactions of life expectancy with the socialization process.
5Although simplifying the picture, that assumption accounts for the fact that a substantial
fraction of dependent people reach that status with totally insu¢ cient nancial means (which
are here approximated by zero for the sake of simplicity).
6To simplify the presentation, we take altruistic agents as perfectly altruistic (a = 1).
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Families are composed of one parent and one child. Children are born at
time t without any cultural trait i 2 fa; ng. Direct vertical socialization to the
parents trait i 2 fa; ng occurs with a probability it+1. If the direct vertical
socialization does not take place, which happens with a probability 1   it+1,
the child then picks up the trait of a model chosen randomly in the population
of reference, which is the population of young adults. Thus, the child will take
the trait a with a probability qt, and the trait n with a probability 1  qt.
Hence, if paat+1 and p
an
t+1 (resp. p
nn
t+1 and p
na
t+1) denote the probabilities that
a child born at t in a family with trait a (resp. n) is socialized to, respectively,
trait a and trait n (resp. n and a), the transition probabilities are:
paat+1 = 
a
t+1 +
 
1  at+1

qt p
an
t+1 =
 
1  at+1

(1  qt)
pnnt+1 = 
n
t+1 +
 
1  nt+1

(1  qt) pnat+1 =
 
1  nt+1

(qt)
(3)
By the Law of Large Numbers, pijt+1 is also equal to the proportion of children
whose parents are of type i who have the cultural trait j. Hence, the proportion
qt+1 of agents born at time t who become of type a follows the dynamic law:
qt+1 =

at+1 +
 
1  at+1

qt

qt +
 
1  nt+1

qt

(1  qt) (4)
The rst term is the probability to be socialized to trait a when having a family
of type a, multiplied by the probability to belong to a family of type a. The
second term is the probability to acquire trait a when being born in a family of
type n, multiplied by the probability to belong to a family of type n.
Following Bisin and Verdier (2001), we assume that parents of type i 2 fa; ng
can socialize their children born at time t vertically, by educating them through
a (purely physical) socialization e¤ort eit (0  eit  1). The socialization e¤ort eit
is an input in the cultural production of their children as adults: it+1 = (e
i
t):
A welfare loss C(eit) is generated by a socialization e¤ort e
i
t. For simplicity, the
disutility from socialization e¤orts takes a quadratic form:
C(eit) = 
 
eit
2
2
(5)
where  accounts for the disutility of socialization e¤orts ( > 0).
Parents, when choosing eit, weight the cost of socialization - C(e
i
t) - against its
expected gains, which depend on the inuence of their e¤ort eit on probabilities
piit+1 and p
ij
t+1, determined by the relation 
i
t+1 = (e
i
t). We assume that all
parents would like their children to be altruistic towards them, in order to
benet from their childrens help.7 This egoistic motivation invites a signicant
renement of the standard Bisin-Verdier (2001) set up, which relies on parental
imperfect altruism, parents wanting their children to be like them.
Regarding how parental e¤orts a¤ect the probabilities of direct transmissions
of traits, there exist various possible transmission technologies. We will rst
consider a transmission technology called "Its the family" by Bisin and Verdier
7As such, we depart from Olivera (2011), who assumes that non-altruistic parents prefer
their children to be non-altruistic.
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(2001). Under that technology, the probability of direct vertical socialization
is independent from the composition of the population. We assume that, for a
child in a family of type a, the probability of direct vertical socialization is:
at+1 = e
a
t (6)
The probability of direct vertical socialization for a child in a family of type n
is equal to 1 minus the parental e¤ort:
nt+1 = 1  ent (7)
The intuition is that egoistic parents, by their e¤orts, reduce the probability
that their children are egoistic like them.
Alternatively, we assume that the probability of direct vertical socialization
for a child depends on the parental socialization e¤ort, as well as on the current
composition of the population. This consists of what Bisin and Verdier (2001)
call the "It takes a village" technology. The probability of direct vertical social-
ization for a child in a family of type a is equal to the socialization e¤ort of the
parent multiplied by the fraction of the population that is altruistic:
at+1 = e
a
t qt (8)
Regarding the probability of direct vertical socialization for a child in a
family of type n, this is assumed to be equal to 1 minus the socialization e¤ort
of the parent, multiplied by the proportion of parents with the altruistic trait:
nt+1 = 1  qtent (9)
2.3 Preferences and decisions
Type-as expected lifetime welfare is given by:
u(cat ) + v(d
a
t )  
(eat )
2
2
+ paat+1v(d
a
t+1) + p
an
t+1v(d
n
t+1) (10)
Hence the problem faced by an altruistic child can be written as8
max
cat ;d
a
t ;e
a
t
u(cat ) + v(d
a
t )  
(eat )
2
2
+ paat+1v(d
a
t+1) + p
an
t+1v(d
n
t+1)
s.t. cat + d
a
t  y
First-order conditions for consumption and aid to the parent yield:
u0(cat ) = v
0(dat ) (11)
8As the agent takes dat+1 as given, we abstract here from demonstration e¤ects. Note,
however, that in a three-period OLG setting, demonstration e¤ects face an inconsistency.
Indeed, a parent does not need to help his own parent to give the example to his child,
since his child will have to help his parent to show the example to his own child. Hence
demonstration cannot work here.
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This condition is independent from the socialization process, that is, from eat ,
and from the expected gains from socialization paat+1v(d
a
t+1) + p
an
t+1v(d
n
t+1).
Regarding the socialization e¤ort, we have, under "Its the family":9
eat = (1  qt)
v(dat+1)  v(dnt+1)

(12)
Thus the socialization e¤ort is decreasing in the cost parameter  and increasing
in the gains from having an altruistic child, equal to v(dat+1) v(dnt+1). The e¤ort
is decreasing in the proportion of the population being altruistic. That property
is known as the "cultural substitution property" (see Bisin Verdier 2001).
The problem faced by a non-altruistic child can be written as:
max
cnt ;d
n
t ;e
n
t
u(cnt )  
(ent )
2
2
+ pnat+1v(d
a
t+1) + p
nn
t+1v(d
n
t+1)
s.t. cnt + d
n
t  y
First-order conditions for consumption and aid to the parent yield:
cnt = y (13)
dnt = 0 (14)
Thus non-altruistic children consume their entire income, and do not give any
help to their dependent parent.
Regarding socialization e¤orts, we have, under "Its the family":
ent = qt
v(dat+1)  v(dnt+1)

(15)
ent di¤ers from e
a
t , since e
n
t is increasing in the proportion of altruistic parents in
the population qt. The reason is that, by socializing their children, non-altruistic
parents reduce the probability of direct vertical socialization to their (egoistic)
trait. That strategy makes sense only if the society includes a large number of
altruistic role models.10
Consider now the "It takes a village" transmission. We have:
eat = qt(1  qt)
v(dat+1)  v(dnt+1)

(16)
ent = q
2
t
v(dat+1)  v(dnt+1)

(17)
Given that qt < 1, a parent invests more, ceteris paribus, in socialization under
"Its the family" than under "It takes a village", since the return on socialization
is always lower under the latter technology. Hence the particular socialization
9Throughout this paper, we assume the interiority of optimal socialization e¤orts, with
0 < eit < 1. This imposes some (weak) restrictions on v() and on the parameter .
10Otherwise, it is better not to socialize children, and to let them take their egoistic trait
in a costless way.
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mechanism at work is not neutral as far as the parental socialization decision
is concerned. The dependency of the socialization e¤ort is observed both for
altruistic and non-altruistic parents.
Having solved for consumptions, aid to parents, and socialization decisions,
we can now characterize the temporary equilibrium of our economy at the
laissez-faire, under the two distinct transmission technologies considered.11
Proposition 1 Consider the laissez-faire economy.
 Under the "Its the family" technology, we have:
ca < cn = y; da = y > dn = 0
eat = (1  qt)
v(y)  v(0)

; ent = qt
v(y)  v(0)

 Under the "It takes a village" technology, we have:
ca < cn = y; da = y > dn = 0
eat = (1  qt) qt
v(y)  v(0)

; ent = q
2
t
v(y)  v(0)

Proof. See the above FOCs.
At the temporary equilibrium under the laissez-faire, there exists a large
inequality between the resources enjoyed by elderly individuals, depending on
whether their children are altruistic or not. Parents of altruistic children benet
from a positive amount of resources given to them by their children, whereas
parents of non-altruistic children are left with no resource at all, which is most
problematic in front of LTC needs. Hence the laissez-faire involves large in-
equalities at the old age. Similar inequalities - but in the reverse direction -
occurs at the young age, where non-altruistic young adults benet from higher
consumptions than altruistic young adults. As a consequence, the proportion
qt of altruistic adults in the population is a major determinant of the aggregate
distribution of consumption at the di¤erent ages of life.
3 Long-run population dynamics
Whereas the previous section characterized the temporary equilibrium of the
economy, that is, its equilibrium for a given partition of the population qt, let
us now examine the dynamics of population. The proportion of altruistic adults
in a cohort follows the dynamic law:
qt+1 =

at+1 +
 
1  at+1

qt

qt +
 
1  nt+1

qt

(1  qt) (18)
11Given the constancy of income over time, we can rewrite dat+1 as a constant fraction  > 0
of the income (i.e. dat+1 = y), and substitute for d
n
t+1 = 0 in the appropriate FOCs.
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Consider rst the "Its the family" transmission. Substituting for probabili-
ties of vertical socialization and denoting [v(y)  v(0)] by , we get:
qt+1 = [e
a
t + (1  eat ) qt] qt + [(1  (1  ent )) qt] (1  qt)
= q2t + qt (1  qt)


The existence, uniqueness and stability of a stationary equilibrium can be
studied by analyzing the properties of the transition function F (qt)  q2t +
qt (1  qt)  . The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Consider the long-run dynamics of qt under the "Its the fam-
ily" transmission technology:
 If v(y) v(0) < 1, there exist only two stationary equilibria, q = 0 and
q = 1. Only q = 0 is locally stable.
 If v(y) v(0) = 1, there exists a continuum [0; 1] of stationary equilibria,
which are all unstable.
 If v(y) v(0) > 1, there exist only two stationary equilibria, q = 0 and
q = 1. Only q = 1 is locally stable.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The dynamics of the population can take three forms. If the welfare gain
from having altruistic children is low, any population including initially some
non-altruistic individuals will turn out to be fully non-altruistic in the long-run.
On the contrary, if the welfare gain from altruistic children is large, the long-
run population will only include altruistic individuals. In the intermediate case,
where v(y) v(0) = 1, any initial population will reproduce itself in the long-run.
Under the "It takes a village" technology, qt follows the law:
qt+1 = q
2 + eat qtqt(1  qt) + ent qtqt(1  qt)
= q2t + q
3
t (1  qt)


Proposition 3 summarizes the long-run dynamics of the population in that case.
Proposition 3 Consider the long-run dynamics of qt under the "It takes a
village" transmission technology:
 If v(y) v(0) < 1, there exist only two stationary equilibria, q = 0 and
q = 1. Only q = 0 is locally stable.
 If v(y) v(0) = 1, there exist only two stationary equilibria, q = 0 and
q = 1. Only q = 0 is locally stable.
 If v(y) v(0) > 1, there exist only three stationary equilibria, q = 0, q =
2
q

v(y) v(0) and q = 1. Equilibria q = 0 and q = 1 are locally stable,
whereas q = 2
q

v(y) v(0) is unstable.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Under a low welfare gain from having altruistic children, the population dy-
namics is close to the one under "Its the family": altruism towards dependent
parents will disappear in the long-run. However, when there is a large welfare
gain from altruistic children, there exist now three - instead of two - stationary
equilibria. The intermediate equilibrium is unstable, and acts as a threshold
below which altruism will disappear, and beyond which altruism will be uni-
versal in the long-run. Such a threshold did not exist in the "Its the family"
case, where, under v(y) v(0) > 1, the population would be fully altruistic in
the long-run for any q0 > 0. This result does not remain true under "It takes a
village", where the generalization of altruism requires q0 > 2
q

v(y) v(0) .
In sum, the proportion of the dependent who are helped by their children
is likely to vary over time, in a direction that depends on how large the wel-
fare gain from having altruistic children is in comparison to the welfare cost
from socialization. In the long-run, altruism towards the dependent can either
disappear or become general, depending on the relative welfare gains from al-
truistic children. That result is robust to the specication of the transmission
technology, even though the "It takes a village" technology involves an unsta-
ble intermediate stationary equilibrium that makes initial conditions relevant,
unlike under the "Its the family" technology.
4 An economy with LTC policy
Let us now introduce a government, which taxes young adults in a non-distortionary
way, in order to provide a help for the elderly parents who are in need of LTC.
The government can observe whether individuals are altruistic or not, and helps
the dependent elderly who are not helped by their children (and not the others).
The government runs a balanced budget, and taxes only the non-altruistic young
adults. Hence, denoting by g the resources spent by the government on each
elderly dependent person in need, and by T the lump sum tax on non-altruistic
children, we have:
(1  qt)T = (1  qt)g
T = g (19)
Following Jousten et al (2005), we assume that the governments productiv-
ity in the provision of LTC services is less good than the one of children. Thus
the elderly who is helped by the State benets from an aid equal to a fraction 
(0 <  < 1) of the dedicated resources g. Hence, if the government cannot tax
more than what would be given by altruistic children, each dependent elderly
parents with non-altruistic children receives an aid equal to g, with:
0 < g < T < y (20)
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4.1 Socialization decisions
As a consequence of public intervention, we now have, under the "Its the family"
technology, the following socialization e¤orts:
eat = (1  qt)
v(y)  v(g)

and ent = qt
v(y)  v(g)

(21)
The welfare gain from having an altruistic child is now lower than under the
laissez-faire, since the government, by providing g to the dependent in case of
non-altruistic children, reduces the loss due to having non-altruistic children.
Consider now the "It takes a village" technology. We have:
eat = (1  qt) qt
v(y)  v(g)

and ent = q
2
t
v(y)  v(g)

(22)
Here again, the socialization e¤orts chosen by parents are now lower, ceteris
paribus, in comparison to the laissez-faire. The State aid, by raising the elderlys
welfare in case of non-altruistic children, reduces welfare gains from having an
altruistic child, as under the "Its the family" technology.
Proposition 4 Consider an economy with a lump sum transfer g > 0 to the
elderly parents with non-altruistic children. Whatever we consider the "Its the
family" or the "It takes a village" technologies, the optimal socialization e¤orts
for all parents are inferior to what these are at the laissez-faire.
Proof. The proof follows from the monotonicity of v().
The extent to which LTC public policy a¤ects parental socialization decisions
depends on how large the governmental aid is with respect to the intrafamily
aid provided by altruistic children. The impact of governmental aid depends
also on the productivity of the government in the production of LTC services.
The higher the productivity of the government is (i.e. the higher  is), the lower
the socialization e¤orts are ceteris paribus, yielding a larger di¤erential in terms
of socialization e¤orts in comparison to the laissez-faire.
The impact of governmental aid depends also on the shape of the elderlys
temporal utility function v(). When v() is close to be at on the [0; y] interval,
the introduction of a governmental aid g 2 ]0; y] has little e¤ect on the welfare
gain from altruistic children, and, thus, on socialization decisions. However, if
v() is quite steeply on the [0; y] interval, the governmental aid reduces the
welfare gain from altruistic children signicantly in comparison to the laissez-
faire, which, in turn, a¤ects the socialization process strongly.
4.2 Long-run population dynamics
As shown above, the introduction of a governmental aid to the dependent elderly
in need reduces the parental incentive to socialize their children. Given that
this tendency a¤ects all parents - whatever these are altruistic or not - it is
tempting to believe that the introduction of the governmental aid is neutral
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regarding long-run population dynamics. However, as we shall now see, that
belief is misleading: the governmental intervention is not neutral for population
dynamics.
Proposition 5 Consider the long-run dynamics of qt under the "Its the fam-
ily" transmission technology. When the government provides a help g to the
dependent elderly who have non-altruistic children, we have:
 If v(y) v(g) < 1, there exist only two stationary equilibria, q = 0 and
q = 1. Only q = 0 is locally stable.
 If v(y) v(g) = 1, there exists a continuum [0; 1] of stationary equilibria,
which are all unstable.
 If v(y) v(g) > 1, there exist only two stationary equilibria, q = 0 and
q = 1. Only q = 1 is locally stable.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The governmental aid to the dependent in need, by reducing the level of
v(y) v(g)
 , tends to make the rst case more likely, and the third case less
likely. Hence a public policy helping the dependent in need tends, in the long-
run, to make the disappearance of altruism more likely. There is thus a kind
of "crowding-out" of the family by the State. That crowding-out is larger the
larger the State resources dedicated to LTC are (i.e. the larger g is), and the
more e¤ective the State is in the production of LTC (i.e. the larger  is).
That crowding-out e¤ect relies on socialization: as soon as the State provides
a sizeable and e¢ cient help to the dependent elderly in need, young parents
have little incentive to socialize their children, since making these altruistic is
costly and has little welfare e¤ects. Hence, due to the State intervention, family
altruism must disappear. Note, however, that although that crowding-out is
possible, it is by no way necessary. It remains possible that v(y) v(g) > 1
despite a positive and e¢ cient public aid. In that case, the population will
turn out to be fully altruistic in the long-run, despite the State aid. Hence the
crowding-out e¤ect is by no way inevitable.
Let us now consider the "It takes a village" technology.
Proposition 6 Consider the long-run dynamics of qt under the "It takes a
village" transmission technology. When the government provides a help g to
the dependent elderly who have non-altruistic children, we have:
 If v(y) v(g) < 1, there exist only two stationary equilibria, q = 0 and
q = 1. Only q = 0 is locally stable.
 If v(y) v(g) = 1, there exist only two stationary equilibria, q = 0 and
q = 1. Only q = 0 is locally stable.
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 If v(y) v(g) > 1, there exist only three stationary equilibria, q = 0,
q = 2
q

v(y) v(g) and q = 1. Equilibria q = 0 and q = 1 are locally stable,
whereas q = 2
q

v(y) v(g) is unstable.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Here again, the introduction of governmental aid makes the long-run disap-
pearance of altruism more likely than under the laissez-faire. But that "crowd-
ing out" is even more likely here than under the "Its the family" technology.
Indeed, whereas the condition v(y) v(g) > 1 su¢ ces to avoid the disappear-
ance of altruism under the "Its the family" transmission technology, the same
is not true under the "It take a village" technology. Indeed, in that case, the
level of the unstable intermediate steady-state equilibrium is now larger than
at the laissez-faire, which suggests that, even if v(y) v(g) > 1, State aid may,
depending on initial conditions, still make altruism disappear in the long-run.
In sum, the public provision of LTC may crowd out family-provided LTC,
by making the disappearance of family altruism more likely. This suggests that
the State and the family may be substitutes in the provision of LTC services.
However, that section shows also that this crowding-out e¤ect varies with the
size and e¢ ciency of the public provision of LTC, as well as with the transmission
technology and with individual preferences.
5 The social optimum and optimal LTC policy
Governmental aid to the dependent in need may modify the composition of the
population, allowing the disappearance of the - (possibly) otherwise surviving -
family altruism. Can we deduce from this that there should be no governmental
policy from a long-run perspective? What would be the best long-run LTC
policy? How would it di¤er from the optimal short-run LTC policy?
To address those issues, note that the lifetime welfares of altruistic agents
with altruistic and non-altruistic children are given by:
u(ca) + v(da)   (e
a
t )
2
2
+ v(da) and u(ca) + v(da)   (e
a
t )
2
2
+ v(g) (23)
whereas the lifetime welfares of non-altruistic agents with altruistic and non-
altruistic children are given by:
u(cn)   (e
n
t )
2
2
+ v(da) and u(cn)   (e
n
t )
2
2
+ v(g) (24)
Those expressions di¤er by the additional term present in the utility function
of the altruistic children, i.e. v(da).
As this is well-known, the construction of a social welfare function when
the population is heterogeneous in altruism can raise serious di¢ culties, since
altruism allows the double-counting of the interests of some agents, whereas the
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interests of others are counted only once (see Hammond 1987). Two possibilities
arise regarding the treatment of altruism. On the one hand, the social planner
can ignore altruism, and only consider the private part of individualswelfare.
On the other hand, the planner can take altruism into account, possibly by
weighting individual utility functions di¤erently. Throughout this paper, we
will choose the former solution, and consider only, in the social welfare function,
the private part of agentswelfare, in order to avoid double-counting.
5.1 The optimal short-run policy
Let us rst consider the rst-best problem in the short-run, that is, for a given
partition q of the population into altruistic and non-altruistic individuals. For
that purpose, we will take, as a social objective, the maximization of social
welfare ex post, that is, social welfare once the type of children has been revealed.
The social planners problem can be rewritten as the following Lagrangian:
max
ca;da;cn;g;ea;en
qpaa
h
u(ca)   (ea)22 + v(da)
i
+ qpan
h
u(ca)   (ea)22 + v(g)
i
+(1  q)pna
h
u(cn)   (en)22 + v(da)
i
+ (1  q)pnn
h
u(cn)   (en)22 + v(g)
i
+ [y   qca   (1  q)cn   qpaada   (1  q)pnada   qpang   (1  q)pnng]
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint. The
rst term is the lifetime welfare of altruistic parents who had altruistic chil-
dren; the second term is the lifetime welfare of altruistic parents who had
non-altruistic children; the third term is the lifetime welfare of non-altruistic
parents who had altruistic children, while the fourth term is the lifetime welfare
of non-altruistic parents who had non-altruistic children. After simplications,
the rst-order conditions for consumptions yield:
u0(ca) = u0(cn) = v0(da) = v0(g) = 
If we consider u() = v(), we have:
ca = cn = da > dn = g
Hence all rst-period consumptions should be equal. Moreover, the con-
sumption at the old age for the dependent elderly should be, if he has altruistic
children, the same as what he had when being young. Only the dependent
elderly with non-altruistic children should get fewer resources, due to the inef-
ciency of public LTC services. Under u() 6= v(), we still have an equalization
of all consumptions at young adulthood (i.e. ca = cn), but things are less
clear regarding how these di¤er from consumption at the old age.
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The FOCs for optimal e¤ort are:12
ea = paa0
"
u(ca)   (e
a
t )
2
2
+ v(da)
#
+ pan0
"
u(ca)   (e
a
t )
2
2
+ v(g)
#
en = pna0
"
u(cn)   (e
n
t )
2
2
+ v(da)
#
+ pnn0
"
u(cn)   (e
n
t )
2
2
+ v(g)
#
Hence, after simplication, we obtain:
ea = (1  q) [v(d
a)  v(g)]

en = q

v(da

)  v(g)

which coincide with the socialization e¤orts chosen in the decentralized economy
when da = da and g = g.
Alternatively, under the "It takes a village" technology, we have:13
ea = (1  q)q [v(d
a)  v(g)]

en = q2
[v(da)  v(g)]

which coincide with the socialization e¤orts chosen in the decentralized economy
when da = da and g = g.
Regarding the decentralization of the social optimum, note rst that, at the
laissez-faire, we have, under u() = v(), that altruistic children dedicate 1/2 of
their income to their elderly parent (i.e.  = 1=2), so that:
ca =
y
2
= da
cn = y
dn = 0
Hence, we have, at the laissez-faire, the equality of ca and da, in conformity
with the social optimum. This is not the case for the consumptions of the non-
altruistic children and their parents. Hence the decentralization of the social
12Remind that:
paa0 = 1  q and pan0 =   (1  q)
pna0 = q and pnn0 =  q
13Remind that we have:
paa0 = q(1  q) and pan0 =  q (1  q)
pna0 =  q2 and pnn0 = q2
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optimum requires a lump sum transfer T from non-altruistic children towards
their dependent parent, so insure that
cn = y   T = y
2
= ca
dn = T = g
Given that the decentralized levels of socialization coincide with the optimal
ones under optimal consumptions, those transfers su¢ ce to decentralize the
short-run social optimum. The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 7 Consider a social planner maximizing the average ex post wel-
fare under a xed partition of the population q.
 Under u() = v(), the social optimum involves:
ca = cn = da > dn = g
as well as socialization e¤orts:
ea = (1  q) [v(d
a)  v(g)]

; en = q

v(da

)  v(g)

under the "Its the family" technology and
ea = (1  q)q [v(d
a)  v(g)]

; en = q2

v(da

)  v(g)

under the "It takes a village" technology.
 Under u() = v(), the social optimum can be decentralized by means of
lump sum transfers g from young non-altruistic agents to the dependent
elderly, with g = y2 .
Proof. The proof follows from the comparison of FOCs of the laissez-faire and
the social optimum.
Thus, when the composition of the population is taken as xed, the social op-
timum can be decentralized by means of lump sum transfers from non-altruistic
children to their parents. Let us now compare this with the decentralization of
the long-run optimum, where the composition of the population is a variable.
5.2 The optimal long-run policy
To examine the long-run social optimum and its decentralization, it is rst
necessary to consider the issue of the optimal composition of the population q. In
the light of the analysis of the long-run dynamics, that question can be reduced
to the comparison of two situations: one in which the population is entirely
composed of altruistic persons (i.e. q = 1), and one where the population is
16
entirely composed of non-altruistic persons (i.e. q = 0).14 As stated in Lemma
1, social welfare is, under u() = v (), larger in the former case, even when the
State intervenes optimally.
Lemma 1 Under u() = v (), social welfare is larger under a fully altruistic
population (i.e. q = 1) than under a fully non-altruistic population (i.e. q = 0),
even when the government intervenes optimally in the later case.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Whereas the proof of Lemma 1 is in the Appendix, we can give here a brief
sketch, to provide the underlying intuitions. Under the laissez-faire, the indirect
utilities under the situations where q = 1 and q = 0 are respectively:
u
y
2

+ v
y
2

? u (y) + v (0) (25)
Under u () = v (), we know, by the concavity of u(), that social welfare under
q = 1 exceeds the one under q = 0. Moreover, when the government intervenes
under q = 0, and taxes the non-altruistic children in order to fund some aid for
their dependent parents, social welfare is, under u () = v ():
u
y
2

+ u


y
2

> u (y) + u (0) (26)
However, comparing the maximum utility under q = 1 and q = 0 yields:
u
y
2

+ u
y
2

> u
y
2

+ u


y
2

(27)
Therefore, the ine¢ ciency of the government in the provision of LTC services
(i.e.  < 1) implies that the maximum social welfare under a fully altruistic
population always exceeds, ceteris paribus, the maximum social welfare under a
fully non-altruistic population. Thus the optimal composition of the population
consists of a population fully made of altruistic persons, since altruism leads to
a more e¢ cient production of LTC in comparison to what a government could
achieve. Hence, the social optimum involves q = 1.
Let us now turn back to the design of the optimum policy from a long-
run perspective. In the light of Section 4, the optimal short-run policy g is
not necessarily optimal from a long-run perspective. Indeed, if the parents of
non-altruistic children receive a governmental aid g, this aid, by reducing the
welfare gain from socializing a child, may induce too low socialization e¤orts,
with the consequence that the long-run population will not be altruistic, in
contradiction with what the maximization of social welfare recommends (see
14Note that, in theory, under the "Its the family" technology, the case where v(y) v(0)

=
1 coincides with a continuum of equilibria. However, we rule out that very special case
here. Moreover, under the "It takes a village" transmission technology, the case where q =
2
q

v(y) v(0) could also occur, but only under the special initial conditions q0 =
2
q

v(y) v(0) .
But given that this third case is unlikely to occur, we will concentrate here on the two other
stationary equilibria: q = 0 and q = 1.
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Lemma 1). Hence, the optimum short-run policy may be at odds with the
maximization of the long-run social welfare, because of the impact of that policy
on the composition of the population through the socialization mechanism.
That tension between the short-run and the long-run social welfare max-
imization is not automatic, as this depends on various aspects of population
dynamics. Several cases should be distinguished. For that purpose, we start by
considering the economy with the "Its the family" technology.
Proposition 8 Consider the economy under the "Its the family" transmission
technology. Suppose u() = v () and 0 < q0 < 1. The optimal provision of LTC
by the government is determined as follows:
 If u(
y
2 ) u(g)
 < 1 for any 0  g  y2 , the optimal (short-run and long-run)
policy is a lump sum transfer g = y2 from non-altruistic children towards
their parents.
 If u(
y
2 ) u(g)
 > 1 for any 0  g  y2 , the optimal (short-run) policy is
a lump sum transfer g = y2 from non-altruistic children towards their
parents, whereas the laissez-faire is optimal in the long-run.
 Otherwise, the convergence towards a stationary equilibrium with q = 1 re-
quires that the (short-run) lump sum transfer from non-altruistic children
towards their parents g satises the condition:
u( y2 ) u(g)
 > 1, implying
g 2 0; y2 . The laissez-faire is optimal in the long-run.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The rst two cases are situations where the State aid to the dependent has
no e¤ect on the long-run composition of the population. As a consequence, the
optimal policy coincides with the optimal short-run policy: a lump sum transfer
from the non-altruistic children towards their dependent parents. In the rst
case, that policy will also hold in the long-run, where altruism has disappeared.
In the second case, that policy will only be transitional, as the disappearance
of non-altruism in the long-run will make that policy irrelevant.
In the third case, the long-run composition of the population is likely to vary
with the level of the governmental aid to the dependent. The lump sum transfer
g cannot take its optimal short-run level, because it has to be compatible
with the inequality
u( y2 ) u(g)
 > 1, which is necessary and su¢ cient for the
convergence towards a fully altruistic society. That transfer will thus be smaller
than the optimal short-run transfer g = y2 , but will nonetheless be strictly
positive.15 Note also that this transfer will only be transitory, since in the
long-run, the population will be fully altruistic, making that transfer irrelevant.
15The inuence of intergenerational composition e¤ects on optimal policy in the context of
socialization models was also highlighted in Ponthiere (2010), but in the context of choices
a¤ecting ones welfare rather than the welfare of others.
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Note that, in the latter case, we do not fully characterize the optimal long-run
transfer, but only provide an interval for it. The reason is that, from a long-
run perspective, what matters is that the population becomes fully altruistic.
Hence, as soon as g satises
u( y2 ) u(g)
 > 1, social welfare in the long-run is
maximized, whatever the precise level of g is. Of course, if one included, in
the social objective, the welfare of all generations living during the transition
towards the steady-state, then the choice of g would be more constrained.16
Let us now consider the "It takes a village" technology.
Proposition 9 Consider the economy under the "It takes a village" transmis-
sion technology. Suppose u() = v () and 0 < q0 < 1. The optimal provision of
LTC by the government is determined as follows:
 If u(
y
2 ) u(g)
  1, for any 0  g  y2 , the optimal (short-run and long-
run) policy is a lump sum transfer g = y2 from non-altruistic children
towards their parents.
 If u(
y
2 ) u(g)
 > 1 for any 0  g  y2 , the optimal (short-run) policy is
a lump sum transfer g = y2 from non-altruistic children towards their
parents, whereas the laissez-faire is optimal in the long-run.
 Otherwise, the convergence towards a stationary equilibrium with q = 1
requires that the (short-run) lump sum transfer from non-altruistic chil-
dren towards their parents g satises the conditions:
u( y2 ) u(g)
 > 1
and qt > 2
q

u( y2 ) u(g)
, implying g 2 0; y2 . The laissez-faire is optimal
in the long-run.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the rst two cases, the long-run dynamics of the population will not vary
with public intervention, and so there is no discrepancy between the optimal
short-run policy and what maximizes social welfare at the stationary equilib-
rium. The same is not true for the third case, where the size of the transfer will
a¤ect the dynamics of the population. In comparison to the "Its the family"
technology, the lump sum transfer must satisfy here not one, but two condi-
tions:
u( y2 ) u(g)
 > 1 and qt > 2
q

u( y2 ) u(g)
. The second constraint, which
depends on the current partition of the population, comes from the intermediate
stationary equilibrium. This acts like a threshold, below which the population
will be non-altruistic in the long-run. That condition restraints the interval of
possible lump sum transfers more than under the "Its the family" technology.
16Regarding this, note that, although it is tempting to recommend the highest transfer such
that
u( y2 ) u(g)

> 1 holds (in order to get as close as possible to what maximizes social
welfare in the short-run), such a strategy may not maximize the intertemporal social welfare,
since this may reduce the speed of convergence towards the steady-state.
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Corollary 1 Take the case where neither
u( y2 ) u(g)
  1, for any 0  g  y2 ,
nor
u( y2 ) u(g)
 > 1, for any 0  g  y2 . The maximum lump sum transfer g
from non-altruistic children to their parents that is compatible with a convergence
towards q = 1 is lower under the "It takes a village" technology than under the
"Its the family" technology. The lower qt is, the larger is the gap between the
two maximum transfers.
Proof. The two conditions from Proposition 9 can be rewritten as:
u
y
2

   > u(g)
u
y
2

  
(qt)
2 > u(g
)
Given that 0 < qt < 1, the second term in the LHS of the rst condition is
smaller, ceteris paribus, than in the second condition. Hence the LHS of the
rst condition is larger than in the second condition. Thus the lump sum transfer
g has a lower maximum value under the second condition.
The intuition is that, under the "It takes a village" technology, the conver-
gence towards a fully altruistic population is conditional on initial conditions,
unlike under "Its the family". Hence, the public aid towards the dependent is
more constrained under the "It takes a village" technology, in order to prevent
the non-convergence towards the equilibrium with a fully altruistic population.
To sum up, there exists a tension between the optimal short-run LTC policy,
which reduces inequalities among the dependent, and the long-run social opti-
mum. The former may, by a¤ecting parental socialization decisions, prevent the
convergence towards the latter. Thus, if one wants to allow the - socially desir-
able - convergence towards a stationary equilibrium with generalized altruism,
the LTC policy should be lower than its optimum short-run level. Evolutionary
forces act thus here as a constraint for policy-makers.
6 Concluding remarks
As a consequence of the ageing process, the provision of LTC services to the
elderly dependent is a major challenge for advanced economies. It is not straight-
forward to dene the optimal role to be played by governments in the provision
of LTC. On the one hand, the large heterogeneity among families justies some
intervention aimed at helping elderly persons in need. On the other hand, public
intervention may crowd out intrafamily aid, and, hence, reduce social welfare.
The goal of this paper was to examine the optimal design of LTC policy
when the public aid to the elderly dependent can crowd out intrafamily aid.
We focused on a particular kind of crowding-out e¤ect: the government, by
intervening, may a¤ect the transmission of values within and across families,
and may make family altruism disappear.
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We developed a three-period OLG model where the population is parti-
tioned in two groups: altruistic persons, who care about their parents, and non-
altruistic persons, who do not. That partition is the outcome of a socialization
process à la Bisin and Verdier (2001), where parental direct vertical socializa-
tion and oblique socialization interact. However, a signicant departure from
the Bisin Verdier approach is that all parental e¤orts are here oriented towards
making children altruistic, whatever parents are altruistic or not.
We showed that a public provision of LTC, by reducing the expected (net)
welfare gains from having an altruistic child, lowers the parental socialization
e¤orts. That reduction does not necessarily imply the disappearance of family
altruism. Whether such a crowding out exists or not depends on (1) individ-
ual preferences; (2) the characteristics of the socialization process (cost and
transmission); (3) initial conditions (under the "It takes a village" technology).
We identied conditions under which there is a conict between the optimal
short-run LTC policy (i.e. under a xed partition of the population) with the
optimal long-run LTC policy (i.e. under a varying partition). Such a conict is
not inevitable, but the public intervention, if xed to its optimal short-run level,
may, under general conditions, prevent the economy from reaching the long-run
social optimum. It is then optimal to reduce the public aid to the highest
level compatible with the long-run social optimum. That "compatible" public
provision of LTC is not zero (i.e. unlike at the laissez-faire), but is generally
inferior to the level decentralizing the short-run social optimum.
In sum, although the public provision of LTC can a¤ect the transmission of
values, and may even make altruism disappear, such a crowding out is by no way
automatic. The existence and size of such a crowding out e¤ect depends on indi-
vidual preferences, and on the particular socialization process that governs the
transmission of values. The latter point, although generally unnoticed, is worth
being underlined. The optimal public intervention depends signicantly on the
"response" induced by the socialization process at work. Given the complexity
of socialization phenomena, there is little doubt that further attention will have
to be paid, in the future, to the interactions between policy and socialization.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The dynamics of the economy is described by the equation:
qt+1  F (qt) = q2t + qt (1  qt)


The existence, uniqueness and stability of a stationary equilibrium can be stud-
ied by analysing the properties of the transition function F (qt).
Note that F (0) = 0 and F (1) = 1, so that both q = 0 and q = 1, being
xed points of F (), are stationary equilibria. Regarding the existence of an
intermediate equilibrium, note that:
F 0(qt) = 2qt + (1  2qt) 

22
is necessarily positive. We also have:
F 0(0) =


and F 0(1) = 2  

Hence, if  > 1, we have: F
0(0) > 1 and F 0(1) < 1, so that the transition
function lies above the 45 line in the neighborhood of 0, and above the 45 line
in the neighborhood of 1. Taking the second-order derivative, we have:
F 00(qt) = 2  2

Given  > 1, we have F
00(qt) < 0 for all levels of qt, so that F (qt) is concave
and admits no inection point, and remains above the 45 line for all levels of
0 < qt < 1. Hence, in that case, there is no intermediate stationary equilibrium.
Moreover, only q = 1 is locally stable, as
jF 0(0)j > 1 and jF 0(1)j < 1
Alternatively, if  < 1, we have: F
0(0) < 1 and F 0(1) > 1, so that F (qt)
lies below the 45 line in the neighborhood of 0, and below the 45 line in the
neighborhood of 1. We have also:
F 00(qt) = 2  2

Given  < 1, we have F
00(qt) > 0 for all levels of qt, so that F (qt) is convex
and admits no inection point, and remains below the 45 line for all levels of
0 < qt < 1. Hence, in that case, there is no intermediate stationary equilibrium.
Moreover, only q = 0 is locally stable, as
jF 0(0)j < 1 and jF 0(1)j > 1
Finally, if  = 1, we have:
F 0(qt) = 2qt + (1  2qt) 1 = 1
F (qt) is linear and of slope 1. Hence, given F (0) = 0, this coincides with the
45 line, so that any partition of the population is a stationary partition. There
is a continuum of stationary equilibria, all of these being unstable.
8.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider now the "It takes a village" technology. We have:
qt+1  G(qt) = q2t + q3t (1  qt)


We have: G(0) = 0, G(1) = 1. Hence both q = 0 and q = 1, being
xed points of G(), are stationary equilibria. Regarding the existence of an
intermediate equilibrium, note that:
G0(qt) = 2qt + q2t (3  4qt)


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We have
G0(0) = 0 and G0(1) = 2  

Hence G() lies below the 45 line in the neighborhood of 0, and lies above
or below the 45 line in the neighborhood of 1, depending on:


? 1
Thus, if  < 1, G() lies below the 45 line in the neighborhood of 1. On the
contrary, if  > 1, then G() lies above the 45 line in the neighborhood of 1.
As a consequence, there must exist at least one intersection of G() with the 45
line for a level of qt that is larger than 0 and smaller than one: an intermediate
steady-state must then exist.
Note also that the second-order derivative is:
G00(qt) = 2 + 6qt (1  2qt) 

Its sign is ambiguous, and may depend on qt. Note that:
G00(0) = 2 > 1 and G00(1) = 2  6

Thus the transition function is convex around qt = 0, and may turn out to be
concave at qt = 1, provided  >
1
3 .
To study the stability of the stationary equilibria, note that
jG0(0)j < 1
Hence q = 0 is a locally stable equilibrium. Moreover, we have, when  < 1:
jG0(1)j > 1
so that q = 1 is not stable in that case. However, when  > 1, we have:
jG0(1)j < 1
so that q = 1 is then locally stable.
Regarding the intermediate stationary equilibrium, note that equalizing qt+1
and qt in the transition function yields:
qt = q
2
t + q
3
t (1  qt)


From which we get a unique value: qt = 2
q

 . Thus the interior equilibrium is
unique. To study its stability, let us notice that:
G0
 
2
r


!
= 3  2 2
r


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Given that  < 1, we necessarily have
G0 2q  > 1, implying instability.
Finally, note that, if  = 1, there exist only two stationary equilibria, q = 0
and q = 1. Moreover, we have:
G0(0) = 0 < 1 and G0(1) = 1
Hence only the rst equilibrium is locally stable.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 5
The dynamics of the economy is described by the equation:
qt+1  F (qt) = [eat + (1  eat ) qt] qt + [(1  (1  ent )) qt] (1  qt)
= q2t + qt (1  qt)
v(ay)  v(g)

The existence, uniqueness and stability of a stationary equilibrium can still be
studied by analyzing the properties of the transition function F (qt)  q2t +
qt (1  qt)  , where  = v(ay)  v(g) instead of v(ay)  v(0) at the laissez-
faire. The existence and stability analyses, which are close to the ones under
the laissez-faire, are not reproduced here.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 6
The dynamics of the economy is described by the equation:
qt+1  G(qt) = q2 + eat qtqt(1  qt) + ent qtqt(1  qt)
= q2t + q
3
t (1  qt)
v(ay)  v(g)

The existence, uniqueness and stability of a stationary equilibrium can thus
be studied by analyzing the properties of the transition function G(qt)  q2t +
qt (1  qt)  , where  = v(ay)  v(g) instead of v(ay)  v(0) at the laissez-
faire. Those analyses being close to the ones under the laissez-faire ones are not
reproduced here.
8.5 Proof of Lemma 1
Let us compare social welfare under two extreme cases, where the population is
composed exclusively of altruistic persons (i.e. q = 1) and where the population
is composed exclusively of non-altruistic persons (i.e. q = 0). Those two cases
coincide with the outcomes that will, under quite general conditions, prevail in
the long-run, as shown in Section 4.
When the long-run population is fully altruistic, social welfare is equal to:
u(ca)   (e
a)
2
2
+ v(da)
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Hence maximum social welfare at the steady-state is obtained by solving:
max
ca;da;ea
u(ca)   (e
a)
2
2
+ v(da) +  [y   ca   da]
First-order conditions yield, under u() = v():
ca = da =
y
2
> ea = 0
Those consumptions prevail also in the long-run under the laissez-faire. Hence
the indirect utility: u
 
y
2

+ v
 
y
2

achieved at the steady-state under q = 1 is
the same as the one that can be achieved at the social optimum.
When the long-run population is fully non-altruistic, social welfare is:
u(cn)   (e
n)
2
2
+ v(dn)
Hence maximum social welfare is obtained by solving the problem:
max
cn;dn;en
u(cn)   (e
n)
2
2
+ v(dn) +  [y   cn   dn]
First-order conditions yield, under u() = v():
cn = dn =
y
2
> en = 0
Consumptions do not coincide with the laissez-faire, at which we have: cn =
y > dn = 0. If one introduces a system of lump sum transfers from the young
to the old, we have, with T = y2 ,
cn = y   T = y
2
> dn = 
y
2
Hence, the indirect utility under the optimal policy when q = 0, which is equal
to u
 
y
2

+ v
 
y2

, is inferior to the one obtained when q = 1, as a consequence
of the ine¢ ciency of the State in the provision of LTC ( < 1):
u
y
2

+ u
y
2

> u
y
2

+ u


y
2

Therefore the optimum consists of a population that is entirely made of altruistic
persons, since altruism leads to a more e¢ cient production of LTC in comparison
to what a government achieves. Hence, the social optimum involves q = 1.
8.6 Proof of Proposition 8
If
u( y2 ) u(g)
 < 1 for any 0  g  y2 , we have, in the long-run, q = 0. That
result holds whatever g is. Hence, in that case where public intervention has no
e¤ect on the population dynamics, the optimal policy in the long-run consists
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of the optimal policy in the short-run, that is, a lump sum transfer g = y2 from
non-altruistic children towards their parents.
If
u( y2 ) u(g)
 > 1 for any 0  g  y2 , the long-run composition of the
population is q = 1. That result holds whatever the public transfer g is. Hence,
in that case, the optimal long-run policy is the laissez-faire. However, in the
short-run, it is optimal to implement a lump sum transfer g = y2 from non-
altruistic children towards their parents.
Otherwise, if we exclude those two cases, the level of the lump sum transfer
g will determine the long-run composition of the population. Given that the
optimal composition is q = 1, the optimal long-run transfer is limited from
above, and is lower than the optimal short-run transfer, since g = y2 would
prevent the survival of altruism in the population in this case. The convergence
towards the stationary equilibrium with q = 1 requires:
u( y2 ) u(g)
 > 1. Hence
the (short-run) lump sum transfer g from non-altruistic children towards their
parents. g must satisfy the condition:
u( y2 ) u(g)
 > 1, implying g
 2 0; y2 .
Here again, the laissez-faire is optimal in the long-run (when q = 1).
8.7 Proof of Proposition 9
Consider rst the case where
u( y2 ) u(g)
  1 for any 0  g  y2 . In that case,
the long-run composition of the population is q = 0. That result holds whatever
the level of g is. Hence, in that case where the public intervention has no e¤ect
on the population dynamics, the optimal policy in the long-run consists of the
optimal policy in the short-run, that is, a lump sum transfer g = y2 from
non-altruistic children towards their parents.
If
u( y2 ) u(g)
 > 1 for any 0  g  y2 , the long-run composition of the
population is q = 1. Here again, that result holds whatever the public transfer g
is. Hence, in that case, the optimal long-run policy is the laissez-faire. However,
in the short-run, it is optimal to implement a lump sum transfer g = y2 from
non-altruistic children towards their parents.
Otherwise, if we exclude those two cases, the level of the lump sum transfer
g will determine the long-run composition of the population. Given that the
optimal q equals 1, the optimal long-run transfer is limited from above, and
is lower than the optimal short-run transfer, since g = y2 would prevent the
survival of altruism in the population in this case. The convergence towards
the stationary equilibrium with q = 1 requires:
u( y2 ) u(g)
 > 1. implying
g 2 0; y2 . Moreover, unlike in the "Its the family" case, we need also q0 to be
strictly larger than the intermediate equilibrium, implying q0 > 2
q

u( y2 ) u(g)
.
Therefore the optimal short-run transfer must satisfy those two conditions. Here
again, the laissez-faire is optimal in the long-run (when q = 1).
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